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Abstract 
Redundant safety systems are commonly used in the process industry to respond to hazardous 
events. In redundant systems composed of identical units, Common Cause Failures (CCFs) can 
significantly influence system performance with regards to reliability and safety. However, their 
impact has been overlooked due to the inherent complexity of modelling common cause induced 
failures. This article develops a reliability model for a redundant safety system using Markov 
analysis approach. The proposed model incorporates process demands in conjunction with CCF 
for the first time and evaluates their impacts on the reliability quantification of safety systems 
without automatic diagnostics. The reliability of the Markov model is quantified by considering 
the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) as a measure for low demand systems. The safety 
performance of the model is analysed using Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) to evaluate the 
frequency of entering a hazardous state that will lead to an accident if the situation is not 
controlled. The utilisation of Markov model for a simple case study of a pressure protection 
system is demonstrated and it is shown that the proposed approach gives a sufficiently accurate 
result for all demand rates, durations, component failure rates and corresponding repair rates for 
low demand mode of operation. The Markov model proposed in this paper assumes the absence 
of automatic diagnostics, along with multiple stage repair strategy for CCFs and restoration of 
the system from hazardous state to the “as good as new” state.  
Keywords: Markov analysis; Safety instrumented systems; Common cause failure; Process 
demand; Hazardous event frequency. 
1.0 Introduction 
Safety systems are widely used to respond to hazardous events e.g. high pressure, high 
temperature, gas release etc and to mitigate their consequences to humans, the environment, and 
plant / financial assets. A safety system should provide an independent layer of protection by 
implementing the safety function through various techniques. In this regard Safety Instrumented 
Systems (SISs) have acquired specific attention in hazardous industries due to their prominent 
role in preventing undesirable events. The required functionality and reliability of a safety 
system are usually deduced from overall hazard and risk analyses. Without adequate design, 
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fabrication, installation, construction, commissioning and maintenance the safety system may 
fail to provide the necessary risk reduction. Hence, a number of standards and guidelines have 
been developed to assist in designing and implementing safety systems. One such standard is 
IEC 61508 [1], that outlines key requirements to all phases of the SIS life cycle of Electric, 
Electronic and Programmable Electronic Systems (E / E / PES). The principles introduced in this 
generic standard are also reflected in its sectorial standards, such as IEC 61511 [2] for the 
process industry. 
 
The SIS performance must be verified using a suitable methodology. No specific technique is 
recommended in IEC 61508 or IEC 61511, although some of these are cited in their appendices. 
Amongst these methods proposed for analysing the SIS reliability are Simplified Equation (SE) 
[1,3], Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [4,5], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [6,7] and Markov 
Analysis [8–10]. More recently, Petri Nets (PN) approach has also been introduced to model the 
SIS reliability [11]. A comparison of these techniques conducted by Rouvroye and Brombacher 
concludes that Markov analysis covers most aspects for quantitative safety evaluation [12]. 
Furthermore, Guo and Yang [4] highlighted that Markov analysis shows more flexibility and is 
the only technique that can describe dynamic transitions among different system states. Jin et al. 
[13] utilised Markov analysis to calculate hazardous event frequency (HEF), which also relates 
to the safety performance of SIS. Innal [14] investigated the performance of different modelling 
approaches and concluded that Markov methods are the most suitable, predominantly due to their 
flexibility (see also [9,15]). Although Markov analysis is one of the most comprehensive 
techniques used today, it is very time consuming to construct the model for a large and complex 
system manually as the number of states increases with the number of system components. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to handle large Markov models as they require a substantial amount 
of calculation. Therefore, it has been widely recognised that the design of Markov models for a 
complex SIS architecture is challenging and error prone [13]. 
 
Bukowski [9] presented a simple Markov model of SIS that explicitly incorporates process 
demand. This model includes both dangerous detected and undetected modes of failure in 
conjunction with process demand, imposed by process system. Jin et al. [13] further developed 
the model created by Bukowski [9] and incorporated the safe failure rate for safety instrumented 
system and repair rate for dangerous undetected failures. A Markov chain was generated by Liu 
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et al. [16] for a 1oo2 system which extends the application of Markov analysis to redundant 
configurations subject to process demand. The Markov transition diagram introduced by Liu et 
al. [16] overlooks the impact of CCF by exclusion, imposing a deficiency on the reliability model 
for 1oo2 systems. In this paper we intend to address this limitation by embedding CCF for a 1oo2 
redundant structure as well as other established component failure modes, in addition to 
incorporating process demand. Furthermore, this model is deemed as one step closer to analysing 
actual behaviour of the redundant configuration since CCF influences reliability and safety 
performances of the safety systems and cannot be discarded. 
 
The main objective of the present article is to explore the relationships between the CCF and SIS 
reliability and safety performance when incorporating both the demand rate and the demand 
duration by using Markov methods. Typical SIS configurations consist of 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3 and 
2oo3 [14]. In this study, only the first two configurations are considered, a 1oo1 safety system 
(i.e. a single unit) and a 1oo2 redundant safety structure. The Markov models of systems with 
more components will be complex and the salient features of the approach will easily disappear 
in the technical calculations. The reliability model developed as part of this research is based on 
Markov chains for their ability to model safety systems precisely and correctly in low demand. 
The paper proposes the integration of the following parameters: dangerous undetected failures, 
common cause failure, safe failures, repair rates, process demand and demand duration. 
 
The proposed reliability model is flexible to accommodate different repair strategies. In this 
paper only the multiple stage repair strategy of CCF has been considered however, where single 
stage repair for CCF is possible (e.g. removal of the vibration source, unblocking the common 
header etc.) the proposed Markov chain can be re-arranged to accommodate an alternative repair 
strategy of redundant configuration. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 
2 discusses the modelling considerations and Section 3 consists of SIS fundamentals. Section 4 is 
devoted to Markov Analysis and Section 5 entail the analysis of 1oo1 and 1oo2 safety systems 
followed by a numerical analysis studied in Section 6. Applications of the developed model are 
discussed in Section 7 based on the results obtained, and conclusions are outlined at the end of 
this section. 
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2.0 Modelling Considerations 
2.1 Safe state 
The primary objective of SIS design is to lead the Equipment Under Control (EUC) to a safe 
state in response to a demand. As the EUC have various modes of operations e.g. start-up, 
shutdown, normal operation etc., it is not always straightforward to define the safe state. In some 
cases, the safe state is to retain the original state of the EUC prior to occurrence of the demand 
such as a Dynamic Positioning (DP) system. In other cases, the safe state corresponds to cease 
the operation of EUC e.g. when equipment is overheated etc. It is common that the EUC remains 
in the safe state after the SIS has responded to a demand in the process hydrocarbon industry. 
The SIS is only reset back to the original state upon deciding to restart the EUC. For instance in 
the event of a loss of containment e.g. gas leakage, the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system 
ceases the process by closing dedicated Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs). The ESD 
system maintains this state, until the remedial action for repair of the leak point has been 
undertaken and the operators have decided to restart the EUC. When the safe state is defined, the 
next step is to design SIS, taking cognisance of “fail-safe” position. This means that upon 
foreseeable SIS failures such as loss of power supply etc, the SIS automatically leads the EUC to 
a safe state. 
2.2 Hazardous event 
A hazardous event is defined as a significant deviation from the normal operating conditions that 
may, if not controlled develop into an accident [5]. As discussed previously, a preventative SIS 
contributes to reduce the likelihood of such events and SISs are used as mitigation measures that 
aim to control and reduce the severity of the consequences. The term Hazardous Event 
Frequency (HEF) is used in this article for quantification of safety performance of SISs. 
Youshiamura et al. [17] offered three categories of hazardous events including repeatable-
hazardous, renewable hazardous and non-renewable fatal hazardous events, these can be 
explained as: 
 Repeatable-hazardous event, where the hazardous event does not necessarily lead to severe 
consequences, even if the SIS fails. 
 Page 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Renewable hazardous events, where the consequence of the hazardous event is detrimental 
to the EUC and possibly the SIS, but not in a way that prevents the systems from being 
restored to the original status within a reasonable timescale. 
 Non-renewable fatal hazardous events, where the damage is extensive, and no recovery is 
possible. The Piper Alpha accident in 1988 is an example of an event of this category. 
2.3 Layers of Protection 
Independent protection layers are often, prescribed to ensure that the desired risk reduction is 
achieved for the equipment under control. Protection layers can be implemented by physical 
barriers such as mechanical systems, instrumented protective functions or in the form of 
administrative procedures. The sequence of protection layers as illustrated by the “onion model” 
[2,18] starts from the centre and proceeds outwards, first with layers contributing towards 
reducing frequency and then with consequence reducing layers [13]. The primary objective of 
the frequency reducing measures is to prevent a hazardous event from occurring e.g. gas leakage, 
whilst the consequence reducing protection layers aim to cease the development of an 
undesirable event into accidents (e.g. explosion, fires etc.) which may harm humans, the 
environment, or material and financial assets. 
 
A SIS can be used in both capacities. High demand SISs are often of the first category of 
protection layers to reduce the likelihood of hazard occurrence, and low demand SISs designed 
to address the latter. In the reliability performance quantification, it is essential to take the 
sequence of activation of protection layers into cognisance. Where a SIS is used to mitigate the 
consequences of a hazardous event, and it appears as the last layer of protection, then the failure 
of SIS may directly lead to an accident. 
2.4 Safety systems 
The term “safety-related system” or “safety system” applies to those systems that solely or in 
conjunction with other systems, achieve and/or maintain a safe status for equipment under 
control [19]. A safety system is an independent protection layer designed to be activated by 
hazardous events. The safety systems may be network-based or require wire infrastructure. The 
network based safety systems are frequently used in a wide range of safety applications due to 
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ease of deployment and as a result of advancement in electronic miniaturisation and radio 
communication. 
3.0 Safety Instrumented Systems 
Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) are widely utilised across process industry to prevent the 
occurrence of hazardous events, such as excessive high pressure hydrocarbon gas leading to loss 
of containment and subsequent fire / explosion. These systems are installed as preventative 
measures to reduce the likelihood of such events. Furthermore, SISs can be used to mitigate the 
consequences of undesirable events such as initiation of an active fire protection system upon 
detection of fire in a process module. A SIS typically comprises of three main elements including 
input device(s) such as sensors, transmitters etc; logic solver(s) including programmable logic 
controllers, relay logic systems etc and final element(s) such as safety valves. A SIS may 
perform one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) to achieve or maintain a safe state for 
the EUC including equipment and/or system the SIS is protecting against a specific process 
demand [5]. As it is the SIF that provides protective function against a specific hazardous 
scenario, the reliability modelling is always conducted with respect to a specific SIF. 
Nevertheless, we refer to reliability of SIS (in line with most of the publications in the literature) 
although what we essentially refer to is one SIF. In this paper, the reliability modelling is 
presented for a single subsystem of identical elements, however it is comparatively effortless to 
extend the computation to the entire SIF. 
3.1 Low demand and High demand 
IEC 61508 identifies two distinct modes of SIS operation including low demand and high 
demand based on two criteria: (i) The frequency at which the SIS is expected to operate in 
response to demands, and (ii) The expected time interval that a failure may remain unrevealed, 
taking into account the proof test frequency. 
 
In accordance with IEC 61508, a SIS is operating in the high demand mode if the demand rate is 
greater than once per year, or greater than twice the frequency of proof tests. Typical high- 
demand SISs are DP systems for ships and offshore mobile vessels, and anti-lock braking 
systems for automobiles. If the demands continuously occur, the mode of operation is known as 
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continuous. A SIS is operating in low demand mode when the demand rate is less than once per 
year, and less than twice the proof test frequency. Examples of low demand SISs include 
Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD), Fire & Gas (F&G) detection systems and Process 
Shutdown Systems (PSD). The duration of demand may also vary from instantaneous up to a 
rather long period e.g. weeks. This article is focused on SISs in low demand applications only. 
3.2 PFD and Integrity level 
The requirements of safety function outlined in [1,2] present a probabilistic approach for the 
quantitative evaluation of the safety performance. This has led to the introduction of probability 
into the assessment of the integrity level and in particular the concept of probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) and probability of failure per hour (PFH). The qualification of SIF performance is 
determined by Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The international standard IEC 61508 establishes 4 
classification of SILs, where SIL 4 corresponds to the highest and SIL 1 to the lowest integrity 
level requirements [1]. In order to claim that a SIF provides a certain integrity level, it is 
necessary (but not sufficient) to achieve a certain reliability performance. In order to quantify the 
reliability, the standard recommends PFD as a reliability measure for low demand SISs and PFH 
for high demand SISs. In accordance with IEC 61508, a SIL should be allocated to each SIF. 
3.3 Failure modes and Testing strategies 
When SIS components fail, the SIS response to the component failures is either a safe or 
dangerous failure of the SIS [1]. Safe failures are characterised by a spurious alarm or trip which 
causes the system to fail safe, e.g. the component operates without demand [19].  Safe failures do 
not have any effect on the ability of the SIS to perform its functions. The safe failure rates are 
denoted by 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆. Dangerous failures are characterised as failures which cause the system to fail 
dangerous, e.g. the component does not operate on demand.  Dangerous failures may prevent the 
SIS from performing its function. The dangerous failure rates are denoted by 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 and the overall 
failure rate of a component λ is obtained from λ = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆. 
 
Dangerous failures are divided into further two subcategories i.e. detected and undetected 
failures. Dangerous Detected (DD) failures are identified by online diagnostic testing, whereas 
Dangerous Undetected (DU) failures remain hidden until revealed by proof testing (or functional 
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testing) in real demand or during a spurious trip when the SIS is fully operated. Similarly the safe 
failures are divided into Safe Detected (SD) and Safe Undetected (SU) failures. Splitting the 
dangerous and safe failures into detected and undetected failures, the overall component failure 
rate consists of the summation of these four main elements: 
 
λ = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 (1) 
 
where 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 represents DD failure rate, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is DU failure rate, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 denotes SU failure rate and 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 
signifies the SD failure rate. Proof tests are normally performed at regular time intervals to reveal 
and correct DU-failures before a demand occurs. Although the necessity of proof testing for high 
demand SISs is not always evident [13], it is essential to perform a proof test for low demand 
SISs to check that a DU-failure does not remain hidden for a long time. 
3.4 Diagnostic testing 
The main purpose of diagnostic testing is to reveal certain types of failures such as signal 
transmission errors without fully operating the main functions of the component and interrupting 
the equipment under control. Diagnostic testing is a feature that is usually embedded within 
programmable electronic components. Diagnostic tests are run frequently, usually every few 
seconds, minutes, or hours. The time interval between the occurrence of dangerous detected 
failures and detection via diagnostic testing is negligible. For low demand SISs, this allows 
adequate time to conduct repair activities and restore the component function prior to the next 
process demand. This assumption may not be valid for high demand SISs as the process demand 
and diagnostic test frequency could be in the same order of magnitude [13]. The fraction of 
dangerous failures that is diagnosed by testing is often referred to as the diagnostic coverage 
[1,2]. IEC 61508 defines the Diagnostic Coverage (DC) rate as the ratio between the failure rate 
of detected failures and the total failure rate [20]. As such, the DC rate for dangerous detected 
represents the effectiveness of the diagnostic test and is given as: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (2) 
 
DC rate distinguishes both the dangerous and safe failures into detected and undetected, resulting 
in four distinct failure modes [21] as: 
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𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷    𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆. 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆     𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆). 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 (3) 
 
The total failure rate is expressed by the following equation considering the estimated DC: 
 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 . 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆). 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 (4) 
 
The impact of diagnostic testing should be carefully incorporated at design stage taking into 
account the influencing elements such as process demand frequency, diagnostic test coverage, 
the diagnostic test interval and time required for completion of the repair. 
3.5 Common Cause Failures 
The importance of CCFs is highlighted by various researchers. Hokstad et al. [22] and 
Lundteigen et al. [23] investigated the importance of CCF in SIS performance assessment. A 
CCF is a failure affecting several or all of the redundant components simultaneously, potentially 
leading to failure of the safety function and subsequently SIS failure in response to a process 
demand.  As such, during the design process, potential CCFs and their impacts on the SIS 
functionality shall be identified and eliminated where deemed practical or reduced as far as 
reasonably practicable [22,23]. The introduction of the common cause expression in reliability 
analysis of safety systems allows for computing the influence of these failures on the PFD of a 
SIS [24,25]. In this regard calculating the PFD for a redundant system can take cognisance of 
such failures by directly introducing them into the failure probability evaluation process [26]. 
Considering the limitations in obtaining CCF data in the process industry in the absence of a sole 
database, the CCF model in this article is developed parametrically. 
 
Several models have been considered in the literature [22] for assessment of CCF to evaluate the 
impact on overall reliability of SIS. These methods include the β factor model [27], the PDS 
method [28], the model of Multiple Greek Letters (MGL) [29], the α factor model [30], the 
Boundary model [19] and the system Cut-off model [19]. This paper uses the β factor model for 
assessment of CCF. The β factor model recommended by IEC 61508 [5,25] is the simplest, most 
commonly used model which implies a fixed proportion of the failures arising from a common 
cause [19]. In this model due to lack of data associated with CCF, β is usually estimated by 
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experts, using the checklist approach [31,32]. Rahimi et al. [33] discussed how human and 
organizational factors may influence CCF in SIS and outlined the challenges in assessing the β 
factor. In accordance with the β factor model, the total failure rate of a component (𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇) is the 
sum of CCF (𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶) and independent failures (𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼) [21]: 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶 (5) 
 
The factor β is defined as the failure probability due to a common cause given the occurrence of 
a failure [23,24], given as: 
 
𝛽𝛽 =  𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇
= 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶
𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶 (6) 
 
The total failure rate of a component (𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇) is then equivalent to: 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 (7) 
 
Taking into account that the detected and undetected failure modes are divided into independent 
and common cause failures, the CCF quantification is as follows: 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶  (8) 
 
The various rates of the detected and undetected dangerous failures become: 
      𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷).𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷      𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷. 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 .𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷      𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷). (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷      𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 . 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 . (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 (9) 
 
where 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 and 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 represent the proportion of detected and undetected common cause failures 
related to the DC rate, respectively [10]. In this paper Safe failures and Dangerous failures are 
considered according to the description provided in Section 3.3. As the objective of Markov 
model is to determine the PFD, only the dangerous failures of the components are considered. 
Additionally, in the proposed Markov model the rate of independent failures is segregated from 
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the total failure rate, such that (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷)𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is used instead of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 for independent DU failures. 
Subsequently CCF rates, 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, leading to subsystem unavailability/failure are clearly identified 
for redundant subsystems. This provides an opportunity for the design engineers/analysers to 
study general behaviour of the system, for instance to measure the probability of system 
operating with only one of the components in failed states which can be used as a risk based 
approach for prioritisation of maintenance backlog for safety systems. 
4.0 Markov analysis and Hazardous Event Frequency 
Markov Analysis (MA) is one of the reliability methods proposed in IEC 61511 [2] to evaluate 
system reliability. It is a holistic approach to model the behaviour of dependable system where 
the rate of change in system status (known as transition) from one state to another is constant. 
The basic principle of Markov analysis is that a system can exist in different states, which 
enables modelling system dynamics such as failure modes of the components, and repair and test 
strategies. Furthermore, this method allows CCF to be explicitly incorporated into the Markov 
models and hence the need for implicit incorporation of CCF models is reduced [22]. The 
Markov chains presented in this article follow homogeneous process indicating that transition 
probabilities are time independent, i.e. components of the system fail at constant failure rate and 
are restored at constant restoration rates [10,16]. This assumption is consistent with useful life of 
components i.e. maturity phase of bathtub curve. 
 
A Markov chain is a transition diagram and graphical representation of system dynamics where 
the nodes correspond to system states (e.g. failure/repair) and the vectors represent the transition 
probabilities. This allows the model to take into account various dependencies between system 
status and to conduct a dynamic analysis of the system [24]. Assuming the transition probability 
from state 𝑖𝑖 to 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡 is denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), the transition rate is obtained from: 
 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = limt→0 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡  (10) 
 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents transition rate from state 𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑗𝑗 which depends only on states 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. 
The transition rate matrix 𝑄𝑄 = �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� of size (𝑟𝑟 × 𝑟𝑟) is constructed from all transition rates 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 ) as follows: 
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𝑄𝑄 = �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = �𝑞𝑞11 ⋯ 𝑞𝑞1𝑛𝑛⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ⋯ 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛
� (11) 
 
As 𝑄𝑄 is a transition rate matrix, the sum of each row of 𝑄𝑄 is equal to zero and all transition rates 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗) are equal to or greater than zero. Using Kolmogorov Forward Equations [5]: 
 
?́?𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡).𝑄𝑄 (12) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = [𝑃𝑃0(𝑡𝑡),𝑃𝑃1(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)], 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is the probability that the system is in state 𝑖𝑖 at time 
𝑡𝑡, and ?́?𝑃(𝑡𝑡) is the time derivative of 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡). The probability of a system being in state 𝑖𝑖 in an 
irreducible continuous time Markov process when 𝑡𝑡 → ∞ is irrespective of the initial state of the 
system and constant: 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = limt→∞𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)    𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑟𝑟 (13) 
& lim 
t→∞
?́?𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 0     𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑟𝑟 (14) 
 
The vector 𝜋𝜋 = [𝜋𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟] represents the steady state probabilities and the fact that the sum of 
the steady state probabilities is always equal to 1. The following linear system of equations can 
be used for a homogeneous Markov chain to calculate the steady state probabilities [5]: 
 
�
𝜋𝜋.𝑄𝑄 = 0
�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1 (15) 
 
The steady state probability for state 𝑖𝑖, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖, is the long-run probability that the system is in state 𝑖𝑖. 
It can also be interpreted as the mean proportion of time the system is in state 𝑖𝑖 [13]. The system 
transits to the hazardous state when a demand is present whilst the SIS is failed dangerously. In a 
Markov model, the frequency of entering a hazardous state can be obtained directly from the 
transition diagram. The hazardous event frequency (HEF) is equal to the visit frequency to state 
0, from any other state [5]: 
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𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖0𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖=1
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 (16) 
 
In this article, we aim to investigate the reliability performance of safety system with redundant 
components assuming that the steady state unavailability (due to dangerous failure) corresponds 
to the average PFD. This takes into account the process demand rate and duration of demand for 
safety systems operating in low demand mode. A framework for Markov analysis of redundant 
safety systems incorporating process demand is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Framework for Markov Analysis of Redundant Safety Systems Incorporating Process Demand 
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5.0 Markov Analysis of Safety Systems 
In this section two reliability models for 1oo1 and 1oo2 safety systems are compiled using 
Markov analysis technique. The reliability models are developed by establishing a set of 
technical assumptions, defining system states, setting test strategies and outlining performance 
indicators for each system individually. 
5.1 1oo1 Safety System 
We start by analysing a 1oo1 simple safety system of pressure relief valve. In order to achieve 
this, the Markov model for a 1oo1 SIS [5] is re-constructed and then amended accordingly to 
adopt characteristics of a simple pressure relief system [16]. 
5.1.1 Assumptions 
The underlying assumptions of this SIS model are as follows: 
 All failure rates (dangerous / safe, detected / undetected) are constant in time; i.e. the times 
to failure are exponentially distributed. 
 Failures occur independently and their severities are constant over time. 
 The system is studied over one test interval. 
 Proof tests are carried out periodically in line with test intervals of the system. 
 Proof tests are comprehensive and 100% accurate. 
 The system can be considered “as good as new” post completion of a repair or a proof test. 
 The process demand rate is constant, i.e. the time between demands is exponentially 
distributed. 
 The process demand duration is exponentially distributed. 
 The restoration time from hazardous state is exponentially distributed. 
 Single repair / maintenance team is available onsite. 
5.1.2 Definition of System States 
The system’s situation consists of the combined effect of the SIS state and process demand 
levied on the SIS. A SIS is in “available” state when it is able to respond to a process demand 
upon occurrence. In this case the SIS is not failed due to DD or DU failure and has not been 
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spuriously activated; SIS is defined as “functioning” state when it is responding to a process 
demand. The “safe state” means that the EUC is in a state where it is safe regardless of whether 
there is a demand, or not. 
 
A state transition diagram [5] for the 1oo1 system is shown in Figure 2. The system transition 
rates including dangerous undetected / detected and associated repair rates are listed as follows: 
 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 DU failure rate - the frequency that a DU failure occurs per hour 
 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 DD failure rate - the frequency that a DD failure occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 DU repair rate - the frequency that an active repair of DU occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 DD repair rate - the frequency that a reset from the DD state occurs per hour 
 
The system transition rates due to safe failures (both detected and undetected) and associated 
repair rate are: 
 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 safe failure rate - the frequency that a safe failure occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 restoration rate - the frequency that a reset from the safe state occurs per hour 
 
Furthermore, the transition rates due to imposition of process demand and system reinstatement 
when process demand is nullified are as follows: 
 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 process demand rate - the frequency that a process demand occurs per hour 
 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 demand reset rate - the frequency that the process demand recovers per hour 
 
Lastly, system restoration from the hazardous state to the fully functional state is: 
 𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇 renewal rate - the frequency that a renewal from hazardous state occurs per hour 
5.1.3 Testing strategies and Repair rates 
In addition to diagnostic testing, the system under study is subject to frequent proof testing, also 
known as functional testing. It is assumed that the proof tests are carried out after regular time 
intervals of length t.  
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Assuming the repair actions are commenced immediately after detection of the failure, the 
equipment downtime is limited to the actual repair time. Hence, the DD repair rate, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, can be 
obtained from the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) as follows: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (17) 
 
However, the equipment downtime for DU failures are not limited to the repair time only as the 
failure is unknown and has not yet been revealed by a diagnostic test. The undetected failures 
can be revealed upon discharge of a process demand or by proof testing assuming these tests are 
comprehensive and 100% accurate in detecting unrevealed failures. The average downtime for 
undetected failures consists of: 
 unknown downtime - the average downtime prior to detection of the failure which is 
equivalent to half of the test intervals i.e. 𝜏𝜏 2�  [5]. 
 known downtime - the equipment downtime due to repair assuming the remedial actions are 
commenced immediately after detection of the failure during proof testing. The time to 
perform a proof test is often negligible and hence excluded from average downtime. 
 
The DU repair rate, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, for an undetected failure can be calculated as: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 +  𝜏𝜏 2�  (18) 
 
Of the two contributors to the downtime of undetected failures, the unknown part is generally 
dominating the overall downtime of equipment. 
5.1.4 System Description 
A Markov model for a simple safety instrumented system of 1oo1 was originally introduced by 
Rausand & Høyland [5]. The states of the considered 1oo1 system are given in Table 1. In the 
transition diagram (Figure 2), state 5 represents the initial and normal operating state, where the 
SIS is available and there is no demand for activation of the SIS. The safe state is represented by 
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state 4 indicating that the EUC is safe regardless of whether there is a demand or not, and hence 
no hazardous event can happen. The transitions between states 5 and 4 are due to safe failure 
(e.g. spurious activation) and restoration. 
 
Table 1 – States of 1oo1 System 
State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous State On Demand 
1 Dangerous Undetected Failure No Demand 
2 Demand State On Demand 
3 Dangerous Detected Failure No Demand 
4 Safe State N/A 
5 Fully Functioning State No Demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – State Transition Diagram for a 1oo1 SIS 
 
In state 3, the SIS sustains a DD-failure while there is no process demand on the SIS. State 1 is 
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state 0 from state 2 when either of DD or DU failure occurs whilst the SIS is responding to a 
process demand in functional status. The hazardous event (state 0) represents a state where the 
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SIS endures a DU- or DD-failure and there is a demand for activation of the SIS. The 
corresponding states linked to hazardous event are 1 – 3. 
 
A Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is used as a simple safety system to examine the application of 
the above model. The primary dangerous failure mode for a PRV is “fail to open” on demand. 
Safe failure modes of PRV comprised of “spurious operation”, “fail to close” and “leakage in 
closed position”. Taking into consideration that the DD failure rate for a PRV is 0 in accordance 
with PDS Data Handbook [34], the state model diagram can be simplified as shown in Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – State Transition Diagram for a 1oo1 PRV 
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the system. It should be noted that PRVs are in fact considered as mechanical devices and not 
classified as a SIS since the other two primary constituents of SIS including sensor / transmitter 
and logic solver elements of the system do not exist. However, considering PRV as the final 
element of a SIS, the Markov model that was originally developed for SIS can be simplified to 
represent the failures modes of mechanical devices such as a PRV. In other words, the 1oo1 PRV 
is an exceptional case of general 1oo1 SIS with process demand incorporated. 
5.1.5 Performance indicators 
The transition rate matrix of a 1oo1 PRV can be constructed from all transition rates as: 
 
𝑄𝑄 = �𝑞𝑞00 ⋯ 𝑞𝑞05⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑞𝑞50 ⋯ 𝑞𝑞55
� (19) 
 
The steady state equations [5] corresponding to the state transition diagram in Figure 3 can be 
obtained from: 
  (𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃5 (𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃2 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃5 
𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃2 
𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃4 = 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃5 
(20) 
 
Taking into account that the sum of steady state probabilities is equal to 1: 
 
𝑃𝑃0 + 𝑃𝑃1 + 𝑃𝑃2 + 𝑃𝑃4 + 𝑃𝑃5 = 1 (21) 
 
The 1oo1 PRV system will not be able to respond to a process demand when it is in state 1, 
hence the PFD of the safety system is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃1 (22) 
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The frequency (per hour) of entering into the hazardous state is equivalent to the visit frequency 
to state 0, from any other state as follows: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃2 (23) 
5.2 1oo2 Safety System 
A typical architecture for safety systems is 1oo2 in which the system is able to provide the 
necessary safety function as long as at least one of the two components is operational. Inclusion 
of redundancy in design improves the reliability of the system when compared to simplex 
structures. However, this introduces a new risk in the form of CCF, which occurs when two or 
more components fail simultaneously due to a common stressor. Using the 1oo1 system as a 
platform, Liu et al. [35] introduced a Markov model for a 1oo2 pressure relief system excluding 
CCF. In this article we intend to introduce a new 1oo2 redundant PRV system by inclusion of 
CCF as well as incorporating process demand within the reliability model. 
5.2.1 Assumptions 
The general underlying assumptions listed in section 5.1.1 are all valid. In addition, the specific 
assumptions of this 1oo2 model are as follows: 
 Repair of CCF is carried out for individual components (i.e. 2 stage repairs). 
 CCF can occur even if one of the channels is in failed state (e.g. power interruption). 
5.2.2 Definition of system states 
Similar to the simple configuration, the 1oo2 safety system consists of the combined effect of the 
SIS states and process demand levied on the safety system. Consistent with the 1oo1 system, DD 
failures are excluded for modelling purpose since the DD failure rates, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, for PRV are 
annulled; subsequently 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is omitted. The system transitions due to dangerous undetected as a 
result of failure, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, and associated repair, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, are intact. Similarly, the system transition rate 
due to safe failures (both detected and undetected), 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆, and associated repair rate, 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆, are 
identical to the 1oo1 system. Furthermore, the process demand and its reset rates as well as 
renewal rate for the 1oo1 system can be adopted for a 1oo2, assuming that the redundant system 
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can be used as a replacement of simple architecture in the same industrial application to enhance 
reliability. The system transition rates in a redundant safety system as outlined in Section 3.5 are 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼  for independent failures and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶  for undetected CCFs where 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 represents an undetected 
CCF factor. Repair rate of DU failures, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, will suffice for the repair of CCFs as noted within 
the underlying assumptions of the model and no requirement for introduction of an additional 
repair rate is identified. 
5.2.3 Testing strategies and Repair rates 
Since the DD failures are not applied to the safety system under study, the diagnostic testing and 
subsequently DD repair rate, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, is not deemed as applicable. This means that only repairs of 
DU failures are required to be incorporated in the model. As discussed in Section 5.1.3 
undetected failures can be revealed upon discharge of a process demand or by proof testing 
assuming perfect testing results in detection of unrevealed failures. Considering that the 
equivalent Mean Down Time (MDT) for an undetected failure of a 1oo2 redundant architecture 
is obtained from 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 +  𝜏𝜏 3� , the DU repair rate, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, for an undetected failure can therefore 
be calculated as [36]: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀 = 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝜏𝜏 3�  (24) 
 
Since the repair of undetected CCF is assumed to be conducted in two stages as opposed to 
single stage repair, no further repair rate is considered in the model. It shall be noted that for 
single stage repair of undetected CCF, the system behaves like a single channel system and the 
mean down time element in Equation (18), MTTR + τ 2� , is an adequate representation. 
 
5.2.4 System Description 
The possible states of the system are listed in Table 2. The nodes in Figure 4 correspond to the 
system states and arrows represent system transition from one state to another. Starting with 
system in fully functional status and no process demand (i.e. state 5), the safety system fails 
safely and transits from state 5 to 6 with a failure rate of 2𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆. This is a minimum of two 
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independent safe failures and includes safe detected and safe undetected which leads to four 
distinct failure rates in total (SD and SU failures for both components 1 and 2). The system will 
transit to state 6, whichever of those failures occurs earliest. 
 
Table 2 – States of a 1oo2 SIS System 
State Property Demand State 
0 Hazardous On Demand 
1 2 DU No Demand 
2 2 Functional On Demand 
3 1 Functional, 1 DU On Demand 
4 1 Functional, 1 DU No Demand 
5 2 Functional No Demand 
6 Safe N/A 
 
Safe failure in this model is only considered for one component of the redundant system and safe 
failure of 2 components (sequential and/or concurrent) is not entailed within this reliability 
model. Hence, the system unavailability solely due to safe failures is not foreseen. Single DU or 
spurious activation does not impact system ability to respond to a process demand and hence has 
no impact on its availability. In this case safety system is defined as in “functioning” state. In 
state 2, the safety system is responding to a process demand when both components are 
functional. Upon fulfilment of the process demand the system transits back to the original state 5. 
The transition rate from state 2 to 3 and state 5 to 4 is 2(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷)𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, which is the minimum of 
two independent DU failures. This failure rate excludes the dangerous undetected CCFs since 
any of the components can fail independently. In state 3, the safety system is responding to a 
process demand with only one component functioning whereas in state 4 no demand is levied on 
the system. The safety system alternates between states 3 and 4 depending on manifestation of a 
process demand or removal of the demand when it ends. Upon identification of the failed 
component during proof test and its repair in any of the states 3 or 4 with 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 repair rate, the 
system transits to the previous states, 2 and 5 respectively. 
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Figure 4 – State Transition Diagram for a 1oo2 System 
 
The CCF failure can occur on 4 separate occasions, one when system is fully functional and 
there is no demand resulting in system transition from state 5 to state 1 with 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 failure rate. 
The CCF can also arise when system is responding to a process demand in state 2 leading to a 
system transition to the hazardous state 0 with the same failure rate. It is necessary to highlight 
that the abovementioned scenarios involve CCF only and do not entail independent failures. It is 
assumed that repair of CCFs are carried out in two consecutive stages for individual components, 
resulting in transition from state 1 to state 4 and then to state 5. No single stage repair for CCF is 
considered in this model and therefore no transition between state 1 and state 5 exists. 
Additionally, CCF may take place when one of the components is in failed status whilst the other 
component is functional. The transition from state 3 to 0 (on demand) or state 4 to 1 (no demand) 
occurs with failure rate 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 which takes both independent and CCF failures into account. 
Example of this scenario is excessive vibration of process pipework causing the remaining 
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functional pressure transmitter to fail whilst the other pressure transmitter already failed due to a 
separate cause. 
 
The system enters hazardous states 0 from state 1 when a process demand occurs with 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 rate 
whilst both components are in failed states either due to a CCF (5-1), two sequential undetected 
failures, or a combination of DU and CCF (5-4-1). Alternatively the hazardous state 0 is reached 
from state 3 where system is responding to a process demand with the only remaining functional 
component (5-2-3) and it fails undetected dangerously, either due to single DU or CCF, resulting 
in removal of the protection layer and exposure to a hazardous event. Appearance of a CCF 
when system is responding to a process demand in state 2 leads to a hazardous state 0. When the 
system enters the hazardous state 0, a restoration action is initiated. Upon completion of the 
restoration with mean time 1 𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇� , the system is started up again in an “as good as new condition” 
in state 5. This can only be accomplished where the hazardous event is either repeatable or 
renewable in accordance with the classification identified by Youshiamura [17]. 
5.2.5 Performance indicators 
The 1oo2 PRV system is a Markov process since the future status of the system depends on the 
current status, regardless of past circumstances of the system. Furthermore, the system fulfils the 
Markov property with stationary transition probabilities, such that the steady state probabilities 
(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 0, … ,6) can be determined from the transition rate matrix. The steady state equations 
corresponding to the Markov transition diagram are as follows: 
 (𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃4 = 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1 + 2(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷)𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃5 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃3 (𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃3 = 2(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷)𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃2 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃4 (𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 2 − 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃2 = 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃3 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃5 (𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑃𝑃4 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃5) 
𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑃𝑃3 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃2) 
𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃6 = 2𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃5 
(25) 
 
Taking cognisance that the summation of steady state probabilities is unity: 
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�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
6
𝑖𝑖=0
= 1 (26) 
 
Similar to the 1oo1, the 1oo2 PRV system will not be able to respond to a process demand when 
it is in state 1, hence the PFD of the safety system is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃1 (27) 
 
The frequency (per hour) of entering into the hazardous state that corresponds to the visit 
frequency to state 0, from all possible states is: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃2 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃3 (28) 
6.0 Numerical Analysis 
We dedicate this section to demonstrate the application of proposed approach to compute the 
unavailability of pressure protection system and the frequency at which the system enters 
hazardous conditions. A basic example of a process system [37] is considered where the 
performance of a 1oo1 PRV is studied and compared with the proposed 1oo2 PRV redundant 
architecture. 
6.1 Application - Study of Pressure Protection System 
Consider a basic process system that consists of a pressure vessel containing volatile flammable 
liquid hydrocarbon. A simplified Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) of the pressure 
vessel and associated safety systems for pressure protection are shown in Figure 5. The vessel 
acts as an intermediate liquid storage unit for downstream system to allow sufficient time for 
processing hydrocarbons. It is assumed that no further liquid processing is conducted within the 
pressure vessel during the liquid retention time i.e. no separation, heating or cooling effect, hence 
the fluid properties including primary constituents, temperature, flash point etc are intact. 
Control of the process fluid is handled through a Basic Process Control System (BPCS) that 
monitors the signal from the Level Transmitter (LT) and controls the operation of the Level 
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Control Valve (LCV). The ratio of the vessel liquid inflow is greater than its discharge line and 
as such the healthy operation of the BPCS is vital to maintain the integrity of the operations. In 
addition to the BPCS, a High Pressure Alarm (PAH) and a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) are 
incorporated within the design as additional independent protection layers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Pressurised Vessel & Safety Systems 
 
6.1.1 Hazardous scenario 
The liquid level within the vessel will rise beyond its operating limit if BPCS fails. Failure of the 
BPCS could be either due to any of the following or a combination of these: 
 Failure of the LT in detection of the level; 
 The control system failure in processing the signal; 
 Failure of LCV or its actuator resulting in valve seizure in open position. 
 
PAH 
PRV 
LT 
BPCS 
LCV 
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Upon failure of BPCS and rise of the liquid level within the vessel, the PAH alerts the operator 
to undertake an appropriate remedial action e.g. shutdown the process system and stop the 
incoming flow. Where the PAH fails to initiate or the operator fails to respond to the alarm, a 
pressure relief valve releases the material to the flare system to prevent over pressurisation of the 
vessel. It is assumed that the flare system is suitably designed to handle excessive liquid and an 
automatic action will be initiated by a robust liquid control system in the flare knock out drum to 
restore the process to the original status within its operating limits. This hazardous condition is 
envisaged as a repeatable hazard. 
 
However, failure of the pressure relief valve (i.e. fails to open) as the last protection layer, whilst 
the liquid level is rising within the vessel and no manual intervention is undertaken, will result in 
over pressurisation of the vessel and ultimately pipework / vessel rupture leading to loss of 
containment. It is assumed that upon loss of containment the Fire & Gas (F&G) system will 
initiate an executive action to shutdown the process system and prevent further liquid inflow. 
The vessel is equipped with a bund which is suitably sized for a full rupture and hence can 
remove flammable liquid upon release to reduce personnel exposure to hazardous material. In 
addition, the process shutdown and isolation of all potential energy sources will prevent further 
escalation of hazardous event if ignited i.e. fire / explosion risk. This is considered as a 
renewable hazard and the system can be restored to the original status upon repair of the vessel / 
associated pipework. Where the vapour release finds an ignition source in the absence of F&G 
initiation (e.g. failure or delay in detection of the flammable atmosphere in a timely manner) it 
results in fire or explosion event. The fire scenarios envisaged are pool fire as a result of vessel 
rupture and substantial sudden loss of containment, or spray fire from high pressure release due 
to flange / pipework leakage. The consequence of release may be an explosion for offshore 
installations (or flash fire for onshore assets) in the case of a delayed ignition with potential for 
generating high overpressure magnitude depending on the level of confinement and congestion 
of the area. Where fire or explosion occurs, it is considered as a non-renewable fatal hazardous 
event and hence is outwith the underlying assumptions of the proposed Markov model in this 
article. 
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6.1.2 Consequence evaluation 
There are no safety and environmental consequences for repeatable hazard (i.e. PRV activation) 
since the flare system including knock out drum is suitably designed for handling excessive 
liquid upon PRV activation. In this case the hazardous material is contained with the 
hydrocarbon system and no loss of containment is expected. The consequence in this case is 
limited to loss of production and cost associated with restoration of the system including start-up. 
The consequence associated with renewable hazard (i.e. unignited events) is more serious due to 
loss of containment. However, initiation of F&G system results in process system shutdown and 
isolation of all electrical sources including activation of platform public alarm and start of 
evacuation process hence, fatality is discounted. Environmental consequence is also insignificant 
due to provision of bund and closed drain system sized for handling liquid removals. 
 
The consequence of non-renewable hazards (i.e. ignited events) resulting in fire / explosion is 
significant with multiple fatalities and hence considered as typical safety outcome of these 
events. Environmental consequences for non-renewable hazardous event consist of discernible 
degradation in quality, availability or biodiversity of habitats within the protected sites and the 
viability of species on a widespread scale, emissions at levels well above industry norms and 
recovery following cessation of casual activity. Commercial considerations include long term 
unavailability of plant, loss of production for significant period of time, reputational damage, 
substantial liability costs, and non-compliance with legislation or consents with possible criminal 
or civil penalties in addition to the cost of plant restoration. Detrimental impacts on the 
prosperity or wellbeing of communities or groups of people are also foreseen for onshore assets. 
6.2 Quantification of Process Demand 
The results of the HAZOP study [37] identified that an overpressure condition due to failure of 
the control system could result in a release of the flammable material to the environment. This is 
one of the initiating events that could propagate into a hazardous event. Other initiating events 
that could lead to a loss of containment such as exposure of the pressure vessel to external fire 
leading to Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) are excluded from this 
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analysis. For this illustrative example, the overpressure condition due to failure of control system 
will only be examined. 
6.2.1 Human Error Analysis 
The likelihood of human error is estimated in this paper using the Human Error Assessment & 
Reduction Technique (HEART) method [38] introduced in 1985. This technique was developed 
to provide an easily understood and quick method that would highlight the major influences on 
human performance and predict the likelihood of human error. HEART is a widely used 
methodology that is based upon human performance literature and assumes that basic human 
reliability is dependent on the generic nature of the task being undertaken. 
 
This technique defines a set of generic tasks that are classified according to the intrinsic nature of 
the task and assigns a nominal probability of failure for each type of generic task. The human 
error probability associated with each generic task can be used to give an indication of the 
likelihood of human error given "ideal" conditions. However, "ideal" conditions do not always 
exist and as such it is assumed that the predicted level of human reliability will degrade subject 
to the extent to which certain error-producing conditions apply. A list of generic tasks and typical 
error-producing conditions are available in [38]. The steps required to calculate the likelihood of 
human error when undertaking the task are to select an appropriate generic task, identifying any 
relevant error-producing conditions and assessing the effect that the relevant error producing 
conditions have on the likelihood of an error. Using this information the predicted human error 
probability can be calculated by: 
 
Likelihood of human error = Nominal Human Unreliability x Error-Producing Condition (29) 
 
The generic task for the PRV example is considered as “restore or shift a system to original or 
new state following procedures, with some checking” with nominal human unreliability of 0.003 
and an error producing condition of “a mismatch between perceived and real risk” corresponding 
to a factor of 4 [38]. Thus, the likelihood of operator failing to respond to the alarm is estimated 
as 1.2 × 10−2. 
 Page 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Process demand frequency 
In this section we analyse the frequency of process demand since concurrent failure of more than 
one mechanism will result in demand imposition on the PRV. The process demand on PRV is 
generated from BPCS failure AND failure of manual control. The failure of BPCS is derived 
from failure of any element including transmitter, hardwire controller and final element. The 
failure of manual control itself can be due to operator’s failure to respond OR failure of PAH. 
According to the PDS reliability data handbook [34] the frequency of a BPCS loop failure 
consists of 3 elements. These elements are failure of LT, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0.6 × 10−6 per hour, failure of a 
hardwire logic controller (analogue input, 1oo1 logic and digital output), 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0.1 × 10−6 per 
hour, and failure of LCV, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 2.2 × 10−6 per hour (frequently operated). The PFD value for 
the PAH failure is obtained 1.3 × 10−3 assuming that the PAH is operating in a clean medium 
with no potential for clogging of sensing line and considering test intervals of 8,760h. By 
modelling the failure mechanisms using CARA FAULT TREE (Figure 6), the process demand 
frequency is calculated as 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 3.86 × 10−8 per hour. 
 
Figure 6 – Process Demand Frequency Fault Tree 
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6.3 Numerical analysis of 1oo1 system 
The PDS handbook provides the following additional estimates for the failures rates: 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0, 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 2.2 × 10−6 per hour and 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 = 1.1 × 10−6  per hour. In addition, we set 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 = 1 ×10−1 per hour, meaning that the mean repair time of a safe failure is 10h. The interval between 
proof tests is assumed to be one year or 𝜏𝜏 = 8,760h. These estimates are uncertain and will 
obviously be strongly dependent on the particular maintenance arrangements. The restoration 
rate from hazardous event is also estimated as 𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇 = 1 × 10−3 per hour [16]. This means that the 
mean restoration time after a hazardous state (or accident) is set to 1000h. As we are addressing 
only repeatable and/or renewable hazardous event, this estimate is deemed as suitable however 
the extent of the damage dominates this value. 
 
The MTTR value is set at 8 hours, consistent with the IEC 61508 [1] default value. Using 
𝜏𝜏 = 8,760h and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 8h the repair rate of dangerous undetected is calculated as 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =2.28 × 10−4 per hour, as per Equation (18). The process hazard rate and its duration are 
considered as 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 3.86 × 10−8 and 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1 × 10−4 per hour respectively. The state 
equations were solved for 1oo1 model by using MATLAB to obtain the HEF and PFD as a 
function of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. The PFD is calculated as 9.55 × 10−3 corresponding to the upper boundary of 
SIL 2 requirements for 1oo1 PRV. The integrity level can be reduced by an order of magnitude 
via incorporation of additional layer of protection e.g. trip function on liquid inflow on high 
level. While designing a system to implement the required function, it is proposed to aim and 
engineer the SIS’s performance to lie in the middle of that IL range. The PFD for each SIS 
corresponding to its integrity level is identified in IEC 61508 [1]. The HEF is calculated as 1.19 × 10−9, indicating a very low likelihood of hazardous event occurrence. 
6.4 Numerical analysis of 1oo2 system 
The 1oo2 PRV consists of 2 relief valves that can respond to a process demand upon imposition 
i.e. concurrent failure of the control loop and manual control. The configuration of considered 
1oo2 PRV system is illustrated in Figure 7. During normal operations (i.e. no process demand) 
the PRVs remain in closed position as the vessel’s pressure is lower than the set pressure of relief 
valves. The PRVs lift to release excessive liquid into the flare system only when process demand 
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occurs. The valves are independent and individually sized for full liquid release meaning that 
only one PRV is sufficient to respond to the overpressure scenario. Failure of one of the PRVs 
will not affect the availability of the pressure relief capability due to redundancy incorporated 
within the design and hence the system is operational as long as one PRV is functional. The 
system enters the hazardous situation only if both PRVs are in failed status and a process demand 
occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – 1oo2 PRV 
 
As shown in Figure 7 the PRVs are connected to the vessel via a common header. For liquid 
services there is a possibility of blockage in the header which results in common cause failure of 
the PRVs. Other underlying factors leading to CCF include but not limited to incorrect selection 
of material for corrosive environment e.g. offshore, incorrect fabrication / installation methods, 
human error in maintenance / calibration / testing etc. In this paper the latter underlying factors 
of CCFs are studied in which the CCF can be rectified in two stages by repair of individual 
components in succession. Using 𝜏𝜏 = 8,760h and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 8h the repair rate of dangerous 
undetected is calculated as 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 3.42 × 10−4 per hour as per Equation (24). An approximate 
value for Beta factor βU = 0.1 is also used in accordance with IEC 61508 [1] for final elements 
in the 1oo2 redundant architecture. The state equations were solved by MATLAB for 1oo2 
model to obtain the PFD and HEF as a function of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 using the failure and repair rates identical 
to the 1oo1 system. 
 
The PFD for 1oo2 PRV is calculated as 7.13 × 10−4 which corresponds to the SIL 3 range 
indicating a more reliable system in comparison with a single PRV case. The redundant PRV 
system enters hazardous event with a frequency value of 2.98 × 10−11, a lower probability when 
PRV PRV 
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compared to the 1oo1 system, resulting in improving safety performance of the system. This is 
also an advantage of utilising a redundant configuration as opposed to a single relief pressure 
protection system with no redundancy. These findings are consistent with the general philosophy 
that utilising a redundant architecture will enhance the reliability and safety performance of the 
system. 
 
A query may arise whether utilising a PRV in conjunction with a rupture disk could also provide 
a suitable level of redundancy with lower capital expenditure. Although rupture disks are more 
cost efficient in comparison with additional redundant PRV, they have their own limitations. 
Rupture disks may only be replaced after activation and cannot be maintained, tested, calibrated 
and recertified (in contrast to PRVs) during their lifetime when in operation. Furthermore, 
spurious activation of a rupture disk may result in relatively significant commercial loss 
including immediate production loss, and loss of revenue due to shutdown period for 
replacement of the rupture disk. On the other hand spurious activation of a PRV in a 1oo2 
configuration will result in production loss only, since PRVs can be isolated and reset 
accordingly with no requirement for production shutdown. Various parameters shall be taken 
into account for selection of a suitable device including but not limited to capital and operational 
expenditure, maintenance requirements, reliability, design conditions etc. However, this was 
beyond the scope of this paper and as such was not explored further. On this basis an assumption 
was made that a 1oo1 simple PRV system can be replaced with the 1oo2 PRV configurations in 
the same industrial application to enhance reliability. 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
6.5.1 PFD and HEF Comparison for 1oo1 vs 1oo2 Systems 
An analysis is conducted in this section to compare the reliability of 1oo1 system versus 1oo2 
system. The models were developed in MATLAB with the parameter values outlined in Sections 
6.2 and 6.3 taking into account variation in CCF rate (βU) between 0.01 and 0.2 as per the IEC 
61508 recommended range for redundant systems. The system performance indicators (PFD & 
HEF) are utilised in this analysis to compare the performance of two models and the results are 
presented in Figure 8 & Figure 9. The PFD of 1oo2 system is an order of magnitude lower than 
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1oo1 system as illustrated in Figure 8 indicating a significant improvement in reliability of the 
system. The PFD for 1oo2 PRV system increases as βU acquires higher values, however the 
increase in PFD is negligible in the region of 10−3. 
 
  
Figure 8 – PFD comparison of 1oo1 vs 1oo2 PRV 
system with varying βU value 
Figure 9 – HEF comparison of 1oo1 PRV vs 1oo2 PRV 
system with varying βU value 
 
The trends of HEF for both systems are shown in Figure 9. It can be observed that whilst the 
frequency of hazardous event for 1oo1 system is constant against the variation in βU values, the 
frequency for 1oo2 increases due to increase in the CCF factor. Comparing the two HEFs clearly 
illustrates a significant reduction in the frequency of system entering the hazardous states. 
Despite an increase in HEF for 1oo2 system as the βU factor obtains higher values, the HEF is 
substantially lower than the 1oo1 system. It shall be noted that the HEF comparison is illustrated 
in a negative logarithmic scale and hence reduction in HEF results in acquisition of higher values 
on y-axis. The abovementioned observations for PFD and HEF are consistent with the overall 
expectations for 1oo1 system versus 1oo2 redundant structures as it is generally accepted that 
any increase in redundancy will result in enhancing system reliability and reducing exposure of 
the process system to hazardous event. 
6.5.2 The effect of 𝝀𝝀𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 and 𝝁𝝁𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 on the reliability of 1oo2 System 
We now study the effect of varying the process system parameters including the demand rate, 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, and demand duration, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 against change in βU. The effect of varying 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 on the PFD and 
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HEF are evaluated for βU in the range of 0.01 - 0.2. The assessment was conducted for demand 
rates equal to 10-9, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 respectively. In order to illustrate the visit frequency 
to hazardous event we use -log10 scale on the y-axis. As seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11 the HEF 
and PFD are functions of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 for the specified βU values. 
 
Increase in process demand means shifting from low demand mode of operations to high demand 
mode where safety system has to respond more frequently to demands from the process system. 
Although the model developed in this paper is solely focused on low demand mode of operation, 
the increase in process demand is studied in this section to analyse the behaviour of the system in 
those scenarios. From Figure 10 the PFD ascends as the CCF rises for various 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, however for 
more frequent process demands, the PFD rises with lower slope and hence loses sensitivity 
gradually to any increase in βU. 
  
Figure 10 – PFD verses βU with varying demand rates 
for a 1oo2 PRV system 
Figure 11 – HEF verses βU with varying demand rates 
for a 1oo2 PRV system 
 
The variation in PFD values can be explained by reviewing the system state diagram in Figure 4. 
As the PFD is equivalent to the probability of system at state 1, any variation in PFD value 
means increase or decrease in the probability of system being in this state. When the demand 
frequency increases, the system will spend a higher proportion of time in states 2, 3 and 4 and 
less in state 1, resulting in reducing the probability of system transition to state 1 and the PFD 
value. The frequency of entering the hazardous state increases when the demand rate increases 
for a 1oo2 system as shown in Figure 11. This was predicted since the system is responding more 
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often to process demand and component failures during this period will affect the system 
capabilities. The curves for the different demand rates have a similar form, but increase with 
different rates as the CCF rate increases. The outcome of this sensitivity investigation is 
consistent with the observations of Liu et al. [16] for the selected values of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 in a 1oo2 PRV 
system as the PFD decreases with demand rate. Moreover, the HEF for 1oo2 PRV system 
exhibits a similar trend to the observations recorded by Liu et al. [16] as the frequency of 
entering the hazardous state increases when the demand rate increases for a low demand system. 
 
The effect of varying 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 on the PFD and HEF is also evaluated for βU in the similar range of 
0.01 - 0.2. The assessment was conducted for demand duration, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, equal to 10
-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2 
and 10-1 respectively. No disparity in the PFD trend for various demand durations is illustrated in 
Figure 12 although an increase in PFD value is observed whilst the CCF rate is on the rise. This 
sensitivity analysis shows that the model is more sensitive to change in CCF rate as opposed to 
the duration of the demand. The PFD increases more than 7 times from the initial βU value of 
0.01 indicating that the 1oo2 system is susceptible to increase in CCF rate as anticipated. 
 
  
Figure 12 – PFD verses βU with varying demand 
durations for a 1oo2 PRV system 
Figure 13 – HEF verses βU with varying demand 
durations for a 1oo2 PRV system 
 
For the system under study the demand duration will last for a short duration since the flare 
system is provided with a level control system that shuts down the process system upon detection 
of high level alarm in the flare knock out drum, therefore, 10-4 is a suitable representative. The 
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system visits the hazardous states more frequently as demonstrated in Figure 13 when βU 
increases. No significant change in system behaviour is identified for various 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 values. In this 
assessment all other parameters including demand rate are considered to be constant. The result 
of the sensitivity analysis for selected values of 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is in line with the findings of Liu et al. in 
[16] for a 1oo2 PRV system, in which the PFD is identified as independent of the demand 
duration and HEF increases with the demand duration for systems operating in low demand 
mode. 
6.5.3 The Effect of 𝝀𝝀𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 and 𝝁𝝁𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 on the reliability of 1oo2 System 
For completion of the sensitivity analysis the effect of varying the component failure rates, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 
and repair rates, 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 against changes in βU are also studied in this paper. Similar to the process 
system demand sensitivity analysis, the effect of varying 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 on the PFD and HEF is evaluated 
for βU in the range of 0.01 - 0.2. The assessment was carried out for failure rates equal to 10
-7, 
10-5, 10-4, 10-3 and 10-2 respectively. Where the component failure rate increases, the system will 
be less available to respond to process demand and this is reflected in Figure 14. A gradual 
increase in PFD can be witnessed when 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is varying between 10
-7 and 10-4 with a substantial 
rapid rise to around 1 when 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is equivalent to 10
-2. 
 
  
Figure 14 – PFD verses βU with different failure rates 
for a 1oo2 PRV system 
Figure 15 – HEF verses βU with different failure Rates 
for a 1oo2 PRV system 
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This behaviour is also observed in the system entering hazardous scenario in Figure 15. As 
shown the exposure to hazardous event increases since the system components fail more 
frequently, impacting system availability to respond to process demand. It is also noted that 
increase in CCF rate will influence the HEF for a component failure rate of 10-7, however 
remains constant for higher values of 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. This is due to the dominant impact of component 
failure rates that neutralise any change in βU values. 
 
The effect of varying 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 on the PFD and HEF is also reviewed for βU in the range of 0.01 - 0.2 
for repair rates equal to 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2 and 10-1 respectively. Increase in repair rate is 
deemed as an improvement in system performance since higher repair rate leads to enhanced 
system availability and Figure 16 demonstrates this effect. It can be seen that the PFD decreases 
when repair rate increases. The decrease in PFD is significant when 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 increases from 10
-5 to 
10-4 and minimal change is observed for repair rates between 10-3 to 10-1. The impact of βU is 
realised for 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 10−5 but weakens for other values of 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. The HEF figures obtained for 
different 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 values shown in Figure 17 is an emphasis of the abovementioned fact. Due to the 
enhanced repair rate, the system is less exposed to hazardous scenario hence reduction in HEF 
can be seen in this figure. Contrary to failure rate figure, the impact of βU is more obvious as 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 increases whilst no notable change in HEF between 10
-2 and 10-1 is identified. 
 
  
Figure 16 – PFD verses βU with different repair rates for 
a 1oo2 PRV system 
Figure 17 – HEF verses βU with different repair rates for 
a 1oo2 PRV system 
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7.0 Conclusions 
This paper has presented a new reliability model for a redundant safety system using Markov 
analysis approach. The main objective of this article was to develop a new model for a 1oo2 
safety system for low demand mode of operation based on an established simple 1oo1 
configuration. This model incorporates process demand imposed on the safety system in 
conjunction with CCF and established system failure modes such as dangerous undetected failure 
rate. The model is predominantly applicable to those safety systems without automatic 
diagnostics where the component dangerous detected failure mode is annulled. Two reliability 
measures have been utilised namely the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) and the 
Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) to measure the reliability and safety performance of the 
model. 
 
The model presented in this paper is an improvement to the Markov model previously outlined 
by Liu et al. [16] by incorporation of CCF however, this model assumes no single stage repair of 
CCFs. In the case where two components are in failed status due to CCF, the repair can only be 
carried out for individual components in two stages in succession. Although this assumption 
limits the application of the model proposed in this paper, it is considered as the normal 
modelling practice for repair of failed components in the industry. 
 
The validity of the model introduced in this research was examined in a case study of pressure 
protection system for a pressure vessel containing flammable liquid hydrocarbon. A comparison 
of 1oo1 vs 1oo2 architecture demonstrates an improvement of the system performance due to the 
introduction of a redundant element within the safety system. This means that utilisation of a 
redundant architecture not only improves reliability of the system but also improves the safety 
performance of the system, resulting in lower frequency of system entering hazardous event. The 
behaviour of the 1oo2 safety system was further assessed by performing sensitivity analysis 
against CCF rate for various process parameters including demand rate and demand duration as 
well as component failure rate and repair rate. The results also indicate deterioration in reliability 
and safety performance of the system due to increase in CCF rate as was expected for redundant 
structures. 
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The proposed model in this paper can be applied to all safety systems that have similar features 
to PRVs such as deluge valves, fire damper (including solenoid valve), circuit breaker and relay, 
where the safety systems have no automatic diagnostic capability [34] and hence the SIS 
structure is reduced to a single element only. It is also worth highlighting that the diagnostic 
capability for some of the other final elements is very low although not annulled (e.g. DC rate for 
control valves in shutdown service only and blowdown valves is equivalent to 20%). This means 
that detection of dangerous failures occurs sporadically for these valves and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is almost 
equivalent to 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷. Hence, an opportunity arises to investigate whether the model developed in this 
paper can be utilised to provide an estimation (with some inaccuracy) of the reliability and safety 
performance for this group of safety systems as opposed to constructing a more complex Markov 
chain by introduction of DD failure rate to this model. This may lead to expansion in application 
of the model to larger scale, although, this was beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The 1oo2 PRV model developed in this paper is based on various underlying assumptions, in 
specific the assumptions made with regards to restoration of the system from the hazardous state 
to the “as good as new” state. The relevance of this assumption may vary and for some 
applications it may not at all be possible to start up again after a hazardous state. In a worst case 
scenario, the whole system (or plant) may be destroyed as a consequence of the hazardous state. 
However, the restoration rate is an essential element of the Markov model since it eliminates 
absorbing state and enables calculation of the steady state probabilities. In some cases however, 
this is neither applicable, nor a realistic assumption. The detailed analysis of a multi-component 
system (e.g. 1oo3, 2oo3 etc) will be more complex from a computational point of view, and the 
main features of the analysis may easily disappear in the computational details, but this has not 
been pursued any further and may be a topic for further work. 
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Notations 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 steady state probability for state 𝑖𝑖 
𝜏𝜏 proof test interval 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) system transition probability from state 𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑗𝑗 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 transition rate from state 𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑗𝑗 
𝛽𝛽 total common cause failure factor 
𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 detected common cause failure factor 
𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 undetected common cause failure factor 
λ component failure rate 
λ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 process demand rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 dangerous failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 dangerous undetected failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆 safe failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 safe detected failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 safe undetected failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶 common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 independent failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼  dangerous detected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶  dangerous detected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼  dangerous undetected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶  dangerous undetected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼  safe detected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶  safe detected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷
𝐼𝐼  safe undetected independent failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶  safe undetected common cause failure rate 
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇 total failure rate 
𝜇𝜇 component repair rate 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 dangerous detected repair rate 
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𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 demand reset rate 
𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 dangerous undetected repair rate 
𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 safe repair rate 
𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇 renewal rate 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 steady state probability of system in state 𝑖𝑖 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 diagnostic coverage rate 
𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) transition matrix at time 𝑡𝑡 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) probability of system in state 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 
𝑄𝑄 transition rate matrix 
𝑟𝑟 states of stochastic process 
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